

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA BAHRAIN

TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 2797

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI UAE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN JORDAN

USINT BAGHDAD IRAQ

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN SAUDI ARABIA

AMEMBASSY DOHA QATAR

AMEMBASSY JIDDA SAUDI ARABIA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON UK

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT OMAN

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MANAMA 0181

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR, PGOV, PINT, ECON, BA

SUBJECT : BAHRAIN - AWASH IN THE GULF

SUMMARY:

(A) WITH INTERMITTENT NOSTALGIA, BAHRAIN IS SEEKING THE FUTURE IN THE VERY GULF REGIONAL COOPERATION U.S. POLICY HAS LONG ADVOCATED. AS THE TRADITIONAL CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH ANGLO/AMERICA BECOMES LESS TENABLE AND RELEVANT, BAHRAIN'S LEADERS ARE FACING UP TO DEPENDENCE ON RICHER AND STRONGER NEIGHBORS. YET THEY ASSUME THE GULF IN WHICH BAHRAIN MUST KEEP AFLOAT WILL BE INEXTRICABLY TIED TO THE INDUSTRIAL WEST, AND THEY HOPE AMERICAN POLITICS WILL NOT PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM PLAYING ITS NATURAL LEADING ROLE.

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(B) AS BAHRAIN BOOMS ITS DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND

SOCIAL TENSIONS INCREASE AND ITS GROWING PAINS BECOME PERHAPS INSTRUCTIVE TO OUR REGIONAL POLICY FORMULATION. BAHRAIN SHARES THE SUPERFICIAL "POLITICAL STABILITY" OF A REGION IN SOCIAL/ECONOMIC REVOLUTION. THE BAHRAINI TENSIONS MAY BE NOT SO MUCH PRELUDE TO INSTABILITY HERE AS PORTENT OF FUTURE TROUBLE ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION.

(C) HENCE POLITICALLY BAHRAIN MAY BECOME LESS INTERESTING TO US IN THE BILATERAL THAN IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT. IN THE MEANTIME OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS HERE, AGAIN OFTEN REGIONAL IN ORIENTATION, GROW APACE. BAHRAIN IS NOT CAUSE FOR ALARM, BUT IT STILL WARRANTS SOME CONCERNED INTEREST. THERE ARE MODEST BUT SIGNIFICANT THINGS THE USG CAN DO HERE TO FOSTER OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND HELP PROTECT LONG-TERM ORDER IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY

1. THE DECLINE OF NEO-COLONIAL PRETENSE

OIL WEALTH AND INDEPENDENCE HAVE NOT BEEN UNMIXED BLESSINGS FOR THE AL KHALIFA AND THEIR RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED SUBJECTS, FOR THEY HAVE BROUGHT LESSONS IN HUMILITY. BEFORE OIL WAS FOUND IN THE GULF (FIRST IN BAHRAIN OVER FORTY YEARS AGO) AND FOR SOME TIME THEREAFTER, BAHRAIN WAS THE RICHEST OF THE POOR; NOW IT IS THE POOREST OF THE RICH. FOR A GENERATION THE AL KHALIFA HOSTED BRITISH CONTROL OF ALL THE GULF AND PRESUMED A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH AMERICAN OILMEN AND NAVAL OFFICERS. THUS TODAY'S NEED TO TAKE POLICY DIRECTION FROM TEHRAN AND RIYADH, AND TO BORROW MONEY FROM KUWAIT AND ABU DHABI, IS HARD TO FACE. BUT THE BAHRAINIS ARE COMING TO FACE REALITY. TWO KEY GOVERNMENT DECISIONS LAST SUMMER DEMONSTRATED THE INFLUENCE IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA NOW EXERT -- THE DISSOLUTION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH OFFENDED BAHRAIN'S TWO LARGE NEIGHBORS AND THE SETTING OF A 1977 TIME LIMIT ON A U.S. NAVY PRESENCE FOR WHICH IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WITHHOLD PUBLIC SUPPORT. ANOTHER ILLUS-TRATION OF THE REAL LIMITS ON BAHRAIN'S "FULL INDEPENDENCE" IS THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF DUCKING MORE CONTROVERSIAL INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, NOTABLY BY ABSTAINING ON KEY UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTES UNLESS THERE IS A GENERAL ARAB CONSENSUS ON THE QUESTION.

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HOWEVER DISTASTEFUL BAHRAIN MAY FIND POLITICAL/MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON NEW-FOUND NEIGHBORS, THE GOVERNMENT IS MAKING AN ECONOMIC VIRTUE OF THE NECESSITY. A GLANCE AT THE RECORD (AND DEFICIT) 1976 BUDGET SHOWS THAT ALMOST TEN PERCENT OF BAHRAIN'S ANTICIPATED "REVENUE" WILL COME FROM ABU DHABI LOANS. EVEN LARGER DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND ARE ANTICIPATED OUTSIDE THE BUDGET FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. MOREOVER, IF BAHRAIN'S GENERALLY ADEQUATE BUT LIGHTLY ARMED

DEFENSE FORCE, NOW ABSORBING ONLY 5 PERCENT OF THE BUDGET, IS EVER TO "MODERNIZE", THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE TO PAY. THE GOVERNMENT'S RELIANCE ON THE OFFICIAL LARGESSE OF NEIGHBORS FOR MEETING ITS GROWING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES IS BUT THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE. MORE BASICALLY MUCH OF BAHRAIN'S ECONOMIC LIFE DEPENDS ON REGIONAL GOODWILL. BAHRAIN IS A NET CRUDE OIL IMPORTER; MOST OF THE CRUDE FOR ITS REFINERY COMES FROM SAUDI ARABIA. BAHRAIN'S ROLE AS REGIONAL AVIATION CENTER FOCUSES ON GULF AIRWAYS, OWNED ALSO BY QATAR, OMAN AND THE UAE. BAHRAIN'S NEWEST MAJOR INDUSTRIAL UNDERTAKING, THE DRY DOCK, IS OPEC-OWNED. BAHRAIN'S APPARENTLY SOUND HOPES FOR BECOMING AN OFFSHORE BANKING CENTER REST SUBSTANTIALLY ON KUWAITI AND SAUDI SUFFERANCE, MANIFESTED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE GULF INTERNATIONAL BANK AND THE UNITED BANK OF KUWAIT AMONG THE 27 INTERNATIONAL BANKS OPENING OFFSHORE UNITS.

3. A STRATEGY OF COOPERATION

THUS BAHRAIN IS SERIOUS ABOUT REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR IT HAS MUCH TO GAIN FROM IT. AND FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT IT APPEARS THAT DAY-TO-DAY WORKING LEVEL COOPERATION AMONG THE GULF STATES IS FLOURISHING. THE GOVERNMENT HOPES TO ENCOURAGE THIS MOMENTUM WHILE SEARCHING FOR LARGER ECONOMIC VENTURES, SUCH AS SHIPPING, AVIATION, AND NUCLEAR POWER, WHICH MIGHT PROVE DRAMATIC BUT SOUND VEHICLES FOR PROVIDING THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC INTER-DEPENDENCE UPON WHICH CLOSER POLITICAL COOPERATION SHOULD REST. KEY MINISTERS PRIVATELY ADMIT BAHRAIN IS PAYING ONLY LIP SERVICE TO THE CONCEPT OF A GULF SECURITY PACT, AT LEAST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE; THE GOVERNMENT IS WARY OF ANY SORT OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONALIZED COOPERATIVE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AMONG ARAB STATES, AND LEARY OF TOO PUBLIC AN IDENTIFICATION WITH

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IRAN IN THE SECURITY FIELD. BAHRAIN'S DISCOMFORT WITH VIGOROUS KUWAITI PUSHING FOR MORE FORMAL GULF COOPERATION REFLECTS THE REALIZATION THAT SAUDI ARABIA, NOT KUWAIT, IS THE ONLY STATE ON THE ARAB SIDE OF THE GULF WHICH CAN PROVIDE LEADERSHIP. CENTRAL TO THIS ASSESSMENT IS HOPE THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS CAPABLE OF KEEPING IRAQ EITHER ON ITS GOOD BEHAVIOR OR AT BAY. PRIVATELY SENIOR BAHRAINI OFFICIALS REVEAL OPTIMISM THAT UNDER NEW SAUDI LEADERSHIP SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT FINALLY FACE UP TO ITS NATURAL ROLE IN THE GULF. THE BAHRAINI LEADERS ALSO EXPRESS, AT LEAST TO US, RELIEF THAT IRAN APPEARS BENIGN IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD COOPERATION AMONG THE GULF ARABS, WILLING TO DEAL WITH THE LITTLE STATES COLLECTIVELY UNDER SAUDI LEADERSHIP RATHER THAN TO EMBARRASS THEM WITH BILATERAL ATTENTION.

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4. WHERE AMERICA COMES IN

HENCE FROM THE BAHRAINI PERSPECTIVE GULF COOPERATION APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED A CERTAIN DIRECTION AND MOMENTUM. LONG-TERM U.S. INTERESTS ARE THEREBY SERVED. THE PARALLEL TENDENCY OF BAHRAIN TO TAKE POLITICAL INSTRUCTION MORE FROM ITS NEIGHBORS THAN FROM US OR THE BRITISH IS MORE THAN COMPENSATED BY THE HOPE SUCH REGIONAL COOPERATION OFFERS FOR THE ORDERLY PROGRESS WHICH AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE AREA REQUIRE.

SIMULTANEOUSLY WE ARE STRUCK BY THE GROWING BAHRAINI CONVICTION THAT THE FATE OF THE ENTIRE GULF REGION IS TIED TO THAT OF THE INDUSTRIAL WEST. FLOWING FROM THIS REALIZATION IS A DESIRE FOR SIGNIFICANT WESTERN PRESENCE IN THE GULF. BUT IN THE BAHRAINI VIEW, TO BE EFFECTIVE THE PRESENCE MUST BE COMMERCIAL, TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL RATHER THAN MILITARY. BAHRAINI LEADERS ARE PRIVATELY EMPHATIC, AND WE

THINK SINCERE, IN URGING THAT THE AMERICAN PRESENCE BE THE LEADING WESTERN ONE IN THE AREA. BUT BEYOND EXHORTATION THE BAHRAINIS CAN DO LITTLE TO ASSURE A CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN ROLE. THEY REALIZE THAT THIS DEPENDS FIRST ON OUR ABILITY TO CONDUCT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN A MANNER PERMITTING DECENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND THEN SIMPLY ON HOW MUCH OUR GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS INTERESTS CONTINUE TO CARE.

5. GROWING PAINS OF REGIONAL PORTENT

BEFORE BAHRAIN'S NEIGHBORS DISMISS IT AS THE POOR-MAN-OUT IN THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC MIRACLE THEY, AND WE, MIGHT PONDER SOME OF THE LESSONS BEING LEARNED HERE: EVEN RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED AND DILIGENT GULF GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT UP TO THE TASKS OF MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. EVEN THE MOST MODEST AND REALISTIC OF GULF DEVELOPMENT PLANS BOGS DOWN. SOME FOREIGN COMMERCIAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS GO BROKE IN THE PROCESS. ULTIMATELY WEALTH IS MEASURED IN HUMAN RATHER THAN MINERAL RESOURCES; AND THE DEUS EX MACHINA OF EXPATRIATE LABOR HAS ITS LIMITATIONS. THE SAND-BLOWN WELFARE STATE IS COSTLY AND PRODUCES MORE EXPECTATION THAN CONTENTMENT. INDUSTRIALIZATION CAN NOT IGNORE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FORCES. WINDFALL OIL PRICE INCREASES BOOMERANG WHEN IMPORT PRICES RISE APACE. AND ALL THESE
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HOMILIES ARE ACADEMIC UNTIL THE SURPLUSES RUN OUT -- THEN COLD REALITY CREEPS INTO THE GULF AND, IN KEEPING WITH TRADITION, FIRST INTO BAHRAIN.

6. WHATEVER HAPPENED TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

THE AL KHALIFA AND THEIR COPS ARE KEEPING BAHRAIN SECURE. THE FAILURE OF THE REGIME TO COPE WITH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND ITS LETHARGY IN DEVISING A POPULARLY ACCEPTABLE HOME-GROWN SUBSTITUTE ARE SERIOUS LOCAL PROBLEMS. BUT IN THE WIDER WORLD THEY ASSUME COMIC-OPERA PROPORTIONS. THE REGIME CAN PRESENTLY SCOFF, SOMEWHAT OVERCONFIDENTLY WE THINK, AT THE IRRELEVANCE OF ITS LEFTIST AND LIBERAL CRITICS BECAUSE POLITICAL THEORY IS NOT THE "IN" GAME IN TOWN. AS THIS MYTHICAL GARDEN OF EDEN TURNS INTO MAIN STREET, GETTING AND SPENDING, NOT MARX AND NASSER, IS WHAT TURNS BAHRAINIS ON.

7. KEEPING UP WITH THE DHOW-JONES

UNFORTUNATELY, MOST BAHRAINIS ARE SPENDING MORE THAN THEY ARE GETTING. THE LAST MONTH HAS PRODUCED WORK STOPPAGES AT SIX MAJOR BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS, AND EVEN THE SPECIAL BRANCH, HYPERSENSITIVE TO POLITICAL PLOTTING, CONSIDERS SOME OF THESE A SPONTANEOUS REACTION TO COST-OF-LIVING PROBLEMS. AS THE WORKING BAHRAINI GETS MORE WAGES, BAHRAIN'S INDUSTRY -- OIL REFINING, ALUMINUM SMELTING AND

REGIONAL SERVICING -- BECOMES LESS COMPETITIVE. WHILE HE IS FORCED TO SPEND EVER MORE TO CONSUME DECENTLY AND KEEP A SHABBY ROOF OVER HIS FAMILY'S HEAD, THE MERCHANT-LANDLORDS WAX FATTER. THE GOVERNMENT IS GAMELY, IF WOBBILY, ATTEMPTING TO SET THINGS RIGHT, WITH PRICE FIXING, COMMODITY SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC HOUSING, AND (PERHAPS) STRINGENT RENT CONTROLS. BUT WITH STATIC OIL INCOME AND GEOMETRICALLY RISING PUBLIC SERVICE AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS, THE GOVERNMENT IS RUNNING OUT OF WHEREWITHAL. THE PIE MUST BE RESLICED, AND A NASTY NOT-SO-PRIVATE NAME CALLING CONTEST IS DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE AL KHALIFA AND THEIR "TORY" MINISTERS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE "WHIG" MERCHANT PRINCES ON THE OTHER OVER WHO MUST PAY THE BILLS. IT IS COMPLICATED BY THE WIDE-SPREAD PERCEPTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER, MOST TORY OF THE AL KHALIFA PRINCES DURING WORKING HOURS, IS BY MOONLIGHT THE MOST GRASPING MERCHANT-LANDLORD OF THEM ALL. AND ALWAYS THE PRESSURE OF REGIONAL AFFLUENCE PRESSES IN, FOR THE LOCAL "FAT CATS" ARE SECRET

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MAKING PEANUTS BY REGIONAL STANDARDS AND THE HARD-PRESSED BAHRAINI WAGE EARNER ASSUMES HE NEED BUT FOLLOW MAHDI TAJIR ACROSS THE WATER TO THOSE "SAVAGE SHEIKHDOMS" TO FIND HIS POT OF GOLD.

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LIMDIS

8. THE CONSEQUENCES

THUS BAHRAIN IS ALREADY FACING SERIOUS SOCIAL/ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH CONTAIN THE INGREDIENTS FOR REAL FUTURE POLITICAL TENSION. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE ABILITY OF THE AL KHALIFA REGIME AND THE SOCIETY TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS NOR SHOULD WE EXAGGERATE THEIR LIKELY EFFECT ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE REGION. BAHRAIN'S VERY DEPENDENCE ON ITS NEIGHBORS GIVES EVEN ITS DISSIDENTS BUT LIMITED SCOPE FOR CAUSING TROUBLE. THE MOST LIKELY CONSEQUENCE OF PROLONGED POLITICAL TENSION IN BAHRAIN WOULD BE OVER-REACTION BY CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS BOTH HERE AND IN NEIGHBORING STATES. THE RESULTANT ARREST OF LIBERALIZING TRENDS MIGHT CREATE PRESSURES FOR SERIOUS EVENTUAL POLITICAL UNREST IN MORE IMPORTANT NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THEREFORE, WHILE BAHRAIN IS
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NOT CAUSE FOR PANIC, THERE REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT U.S. INTEREST IN THE ORDERLINESS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT. WE SHOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY OFFICIAL ACTIONS TO FOSTER SOUND PROGRESS HERE AS PART OF A WIDER GULF POLICY.

9. WHAT WE NEED TO DO -- HERE

IN THE LAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE DEVOTED SOME SCARCE RESOURCES AND SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TOWARD ESTABLISHING AN APPROPRIATE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP WITH BAHRAIN. AS WE PREPARE TO EXPAND OUR DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE TO INCLUDE RESIDENT CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES, WE WILL HAVE BEGUN TO TAKE THE SORT OF ACTIONS NEEDED TO FURTHER OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS, INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR PRESENCE DEPENDS MUCH ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S BEING CAPABLE OF RESPONDING PROMPTLY AND FLEXIBLY TO LITTLE NEEDS. (A) GUNS: FOR INSTANCE, BAHRAIN'S CROWN PRINCE WANTS MORE U.S. ARMS AND MILITARY TRAINING FOR HIS DEFENSE FORCE THAN HIS FATHER AND THE GOVERNMENT ARE LIKELY TO LET HIM HAVE, BUT THERE WILL BE CASE-BY-CASE OPPORTUNITIES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO MODEST AND REASONABLE BAHRAINI DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. WE SHOULD DO SO PROMPTLY. (B) AND TECHNOLOGY: BAHRAIN'S NEED FOR AMERICAN TECHNICAL

ASSISTANCE, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IS QUITE REAL AND KEENLY FELT. WE NEED TO IMPLEMENT OUR PROPOSED COST-SHARING AID ADVISORY PROGRAM PROMPTLY AND WELL. AS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT COMMISSION IN SAUDI ARABIA DEVELOP, THERE SHOULD BE NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES FOR US TO SEND AMERICAN EXPERTS SERVING THERE TO BAHRAIN, AND PRESUMABLY OTHER GULF STATES, FOR BRIEF ADVISORY VISITS. WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO THESE POSSIBILITIES, WHICH WILL REPRESENT NOT ONLY A DIRECT AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION TO ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALL STATES BUT ALSO WILL FURTHER THE CONCEPT OF SAUDI COOPERATION WITH THEM. (C) AND COMMERCE: IN BAHRAIN, AS PERHAPS IN OTHER SMALL GULF STATES, THE AMERICAN COMMERCIAL EFFORT IS INADEQUATE TO THE LOCAL DEMAND FOR OUR GOODS AND SERVICES AND OUR OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THIS GAP HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT. IT IS PERFECTLY REASONABLE THAT THE PRIMARY EMPHASIS IN OUR BUSINESS PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA BE IN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AND AFTER THAT IN KUWAIT AND THE UAE, BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SMALLER MARKETS NOT BE COMPLETELY IGNORED OR NEARLY SO. IN THIS RESPECT, OUR PRIORITIES SEEM RIGHT BUT OUR EFFORT TO FULFILL THEM ALL APPEARS INADEQUATE. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION HERE THAT
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THE U.S. IS NOT ALONE IN HAVING TROUBLE PERSUADING ITS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS TO DEVOTE SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE SMALLER GULF ECONOMIES BUT THIS FACT SHOULD NOT EXCUSE US FROM A GREATER EFFORT. (D) AND BUTTERING UP: THROUGHOUT OUR DEALINGS WITH BAHRAIN, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE SENSITIVITY WITH WHICH THE LEADERSHIP IS HAVING TO ACCEPT ITS APPROPRIATE PLACE IN THE WORLD AND REGIONAL PECKING ORDER. IN ARRANGING OFFICIAL VISITS AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS, WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO INCLUDE BAHRAIN AND THE OTHER SMALLER GULF STATES WHERE POSSIBLE AND PARTICULARLY NOT TO SLIGHT ONE WHILE APPEASING THE OTHER. IF THE U.S. NAVY'S MIDDLE EAST FORCE DOES HAVE TO LEAVE BY MID-1977, WE SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL TO CONDUCT OURSELVES DURING THE TRANSITION AND DEPARTURE IN A MANNER BEFITTING LONG-STANDING, AND ON-GOING, FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

10. -- AND THERE

THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH WE CAN MAKE TO FURTHERING OUR INTERESTS IN BAHRAIN AND THE GULF WILL CONTINUE TO BE ACTIONS EXTENDING WELL BEYOND THIS PARTICULAR REGION. THE BAHRAINIS LOOK TO US AND US ALONE TO KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AND CHECK SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION WORLDWIDE. EVEN IF BAHRAIN AND THE OTHER GULF STATES CONCLUDE THAT THEY DO NOT NEED A U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF, THIS BY NO MEANS PRECLUDES THE NEED FOR U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IN OUR VIEW, AN EFFECTIVE U.S. NAVY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD SERVE NOT ONLY OUR OWN INTERESTS BUT THOSE OF THE GULF LITTORALS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE

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